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Limitation of Liability Act
Limitation of Liability Act-Coverage of the
Ship Owner
With a view to encouraging investment in the maritime industry,'
Congress enacted laws2 enabling the owner of a vessel to limit liability in-
curred through the operation of his ship to the value of his interest in the
ship.8 Although the principles of limitation of the shipowner's liability
are of ancient origin,4 the existing codification is often ambiguous and
at times inconsistent.5 The apparent exactness of the statutory descrip-
tion of those entitled to limitation is deceiving. An analysis of the
cases in which the issue of coverage has arisen is necessary for an under-
standing of the deception within the statute and of the solution that the
courts have achieved.
RIGHT TO LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
The act providing limitation of liability clearly states that the lia-
bility "of the owner of any vessel" may be limited in appropriate pro-
ceedings.8 The deception in the simplicity of this phrase becomes
apparent when thought is given to the variety of transactions affecting
ownership which is common to the maritime industry. The purpose
of the act is to encourage investment by exempting the investor from
loss in excess of the fund he is willing to risk in the enterprise.' As
maintained by Justice Holmes, "owner" is an "untechnical word" which
must be interpreted in the liberal way in which it was used.' Although
"owner" is not defined in the statute, the fact that a "charterer" under
certain circumstances is also given the same protection9 demonstrates a
1. Blink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 62 (1929).
2. 9 Star. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1958).
3. See generally 3 BENEDICT, AMERIcAN ADMIRALTY §§ 474-544 (6th ed. 1940); 1 EDEL-
MAN, MARITIME INJURY AND DEATH ch. XII (1960).
4. According to Justice Brown, in The Main v. Williams, there were provisions for the limita-
tion of liability in the Consolato del Mare of the fifteenth century. 152 U.S. 122, 126 (1894).
5. See GILMORE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 664-65, 676-77 (1957). Enacted over a period
of eighty-five years, the statutes in effect will be referred to as codified, in the singular.
6. 9 Stat. 635' (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 5 183 (1958).
7. Plink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 62 (1929). One-ship corporations operated by a holding
company would achieve the same result. However, the corporation was not as prevalent a
form of ownership when the statute was originally enacted as it is now. See ROBINSON, AD-
MIRALTY LAW 898-99 (1939).
8. Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 63 (1929).
9. 9 Stat. 636 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1958). "The charter of any vessel,
in case he shall man, victual, and navigate such vessel at his own expense, or by his own pro-
curement, shall be deemed the owner of such vessel within the meaning of the provisions of
this chapter relating to the limitation of the liability of the owners of vessels; and such vessel,
when so chartered, shall be liable in the same manner as if navigated by the owner thereof."
The coverage of this section of the act is not within the scope of this paper.
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congressional intent of wide application of the act's provisions.1" The
words of the act must be taken in a broad and popular sense in order not
to defeat the intent of Congress."
Adjudications under the act demonstrate that ownership has been
ascertained neither by rigid inquiry respecting the muniments of title
showing ownership to be absolute and unreserved, nor upon the mere
forms of transactions involving an interest in a vessel. 2 Rather, the
issue of whether one is to be deemed an "owner" seems to depend largely
upon the possibility that he may be subjected to a liability which is
ordinarily assertable against one having dominion over the res."3 In
other words, one can limit his liability as an "owner" if he is liable
as an "owner." Analysis of the cases reveals that the courts, in their con-
cern for effecting the intent of Congress, have expanded the meaning
of "owner" far beyond that commonly given to the term. From their
first encounter with the problem, courts, with one exception, have dis-
played a liberality that seems in each case to exceed its predecessor.
LIABILITY OF THE OWNER
The principle of basing the right to limitation of liability as an owner
upon the presence of such a liability is clearly set forth by the Supreme
Court in the case of Flink v. Paladini.4 In that case the ship was owned
by a California corporation. Under the existing state law each stock-
holder was individually and personally liable for such proportion of the
corporate debts and liabilities contracted during the time that he was a
stockholder, as the amount of his stock bore to the whole. It was con-
tended that the corporation, not the stockholders, was the "owner" of
the ship, and that the stockholders were therefore not entitled to a limi-
tation of their statutory liability. The Supreme Court, in light of the
purpose of the act, declared that
... no rational distinction can be taken between several persons own-
ing shares in a vessel directly and making the same division by putting
the tide in a corporation and distributing the corporate stock. The policy
of the statutes must extend equally to both. In common speech the
stockholders would be called owners, recognizing that their pecuniary
interest [and liability] did not differ substantially from those who held
shares in the ship.'5
Justice Holmes added that the California law "... leaves the members
to a certain extent in the position of copartners. But that is the liability
10. The Milwaukee, 48 F.2d 842 (E.D. Wis. 1931).
11. Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 63 (1929).
12. The Milwaukee, 48 F.2d 842 (E.D. Wis. 1931).
13. Ibid.
14. 279 U.S. 59 (1929).
15. Id. at 62-63.
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that the acts of Congress mean to limit'" The fact that the individuals
did not "own" the ship directly was not controlling because they had been
subjected to potential liability as owners by the California statute.'
Flink v. Paladini, the first Supreme Court case on this point, set a pattern
of liberality in construing "owner" that is extant today. It negatives the
thought that "owner" of a vessel means the possessor of full tide, interest,
or dominion, and that nothing else is within the definition of the right
or range of the statute.18
Two years later a federal district court for Wisconsin, in The Mil-
waukee, 9 relied heavily on the rationale of Flink v. Paladini. In The
Milwaukee the court was confronted with a situation in which liability
was incurred subsequent to the execution of a conditional contract of sale
of a car ferry, but prior to its performance. The court granted the peti-
tion for limitation of liability because of the illogic in finding the peti-
tioner-corporation liable on the basis of its ownership and then denying
the right to limitation on the basis of lack of ownership.20
[T]he petitioner has shown a relationship to the vessel and its operation
which ... furnishes ground for asserting either a qualified ownership,
or some substantial legal interest, pending the consummation... [of the
contract]. 2 '
The court in effect held that any interest in a vessel substantial enough
to impose liability is sufficient to confer the right to limitation.
The Flink case shows that lack of legal title need not prevent limita-
tion as an owner, while, in contrast, American Car & Foundry Co. v.
Brassert2" shows that full legal title is not necessarily sufficient to en-
title the holder to limitation as an owner. In the Brassert case the peti-
tioner for limitation was the corporate builder of the vessel, which had
retained tide to it under a contract of conditional sale. The buyer, who
by contract had complete control of and responsibility for the vessel, was
injured, probably due to a defect in the construction of the vessel. The
builder, in an action for payments due on the sale price, sought to limit its
16. Id. at 63.
17. The corporation itself was entitled to limit its liability to the value of its interest in
the ship.
In contrast to the situation under the old California statute, the stockholder typically is not
liable beyond his original capital contribution for the losses of the corporation. In The Cleveco
it was held that mere ownership of stock in the corporation owning the vessel did not create
liability, and therefore the petition for limitation, as well as the claims against the stockholders,
was dismissed. 59 F. Supp. 71, 77 (N.D. Ohio 1944), aff'd, 154 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1946).
18. The Milwaukee, 48 F.2d 842 (E.D. Wis. 1931).
19. Ibid.
20. It is proper pleading in admiralty for a petitioner to allege that it is not the owner of a
vessel and alternatively that if proven to be the owner that it is then entitled to the protection
of the act. Star Brick Corp. v. Johnson, 262 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1959).
21. The Milwaukee, 48 F.2d 842, 844 (E.D. Wis. 1931).
22. 289 U.S. 261 (1933).
1963]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
liability for breach of warranty. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial
of the petition for limitation, stating that ".. . mere... naked legal title
to the vessel ...unquestionably would not render . . . [the vendors]
liable as owners ...."" The builder was liable, if at all, for negligent
manufacture, and not by reason of retaining legal title. Shipbuilding as
a mere manufacturing enterprise is not a maritime industry in need of
congressional encouragement and is not entitled to the protection of the
limitation act. Because the petitioner was not liable as an owner, it could
not limit its liability as an owner.
Since the legal relations which comprise ownership of a vessel can
be split vertically so that several persons are owners, as in a partnership,
and each is able to claim the protection of the statute, there seems to be
little reason why the statute should not also apply where those same legal
relations are split horizontally, as in the trustee-beneficiary situation."4
An example of the latter relationship is Petition of Colonial Trust Co.,2
a case in which a trustee held legal title and the registration to a pleasure
yacht. The beneficiary of a life interest in the yacht had full and ex-
clusive possession and control of the vessel and was responsible for its
maintenance and operation. Both the legal and equitable titleholders
were sued as owners. It was held that both were entitled to limitation of
liability because each had sufficient legal standing to constitute what has
been traditionally recognized in the law as title, either legal or equitable,
with substantial rights and powers in dealing with the property, that is,
something more than mere possession and control. Because both parties
were subject to liability as owners, both were entitled to limitation of that
liability.
LIABILITY OF THE NON-OWNER
The law as previously stated by the courts was considerably broadened
in In re The Trojan,2" Prior cases had been concerned with limiting the
liability of a person who was the owner of the vessel at the time that the
alleged injury occurred. In this case the issue was whether a person, who
23. Id. at 265.
24. Petition of Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Conn. 1954). The statutory
trustees of a corporation whose charter has been temporarily cancelled by the state may properly
petition for limitation of liability. See Loc-Wood Boat & Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d
306, 311 (8th Cit. 1957).
The chartering of a vessel is yet another type of splitting of ownership. It is clear that the
owner of a vessel remains the "owner" for the purposes of the statute, even though he has
chartered it to another party. See Petition of Skibs A/S Jolund, 250 F.2d 777 (2d Cit. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 933 (1958); The Suduffco, 33 F.2d 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). Moreover,
the owner of a vessel is entitled to limitation of his liability even though the vessel at the time
of the accident was not under his direction and control. Petition of Anthony O'Boyle, 51 F.
Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
25. 124 F. Supp. 73 (D. Conn. 1954).
26. 167 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
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at the time of the accident had neither legal nor equitable title, qualifies
as an owner if the accident was proximately caused by such person's con-
duct at a prior time when he unquestionably was the owner.
The United States government, at the time of its sale of The Trojan
to a shipping company, separately sold a quantity of oil in its tanks. In-
stead of oil, as represented, the fluid was a volatile mixture, which after
the sale caused an explosion resulting in extensive damage to the claim-
ant Although authorities were cited in which the courts had upheld
petitions filed after the petitioners had disposed of their ownership in the
vessels, in each of such cases the liability against which limitation was
sought arose during the period of the petitioner's ownership." In the
Trojan case liability, if any, arose after the United States had disposed of
all right, title, and interest in the vessel. The court, influenced by the
design of Congress to encourage investment in the shipping industry,
stated that the petition for limitation would not be dismissed, because the
alleged liability arose as the result of negligent conduct occurring before
sale and during ownership, at which time limitation would dearly have
been available. The Trojan court summarily distinguished the Brassert
case, which had denied limitation to a vendor liable for breach of war-
ranty. The court stated that in the Brassert case the vendor's liability was
that of a manufacturer, while in the Trojan case it was that of an owner-
vendor.28
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in deciding Admiral
Towing Co. v. Woolen," stressed the words of the Supreme Court in
Flink that the act should be given a broad construction so as to achieve
Congress' purpose, rather than the Court's indication in Brassert that a
mortgagee not in possession was not an owner within the meaning of the
statute. In the Admiral case the agent of the mortgagee had taken con-
trol of the mortgaged vessel to sail it to the mortgagee's port so that the
mortgagee would ultimately receive legal title. The court stated:
When... a mortagee... comes into possession and control of a vessel
as the first step in a process which is to culminate uninterruptedly in his
becoming the holder of legal tide to her, we think he becomes an
owner for purposes of limiting his liability.... For all intents and pur-
poses, when... [the mortgaged ship] was given over to ... [the
mortgagee's agent] by . . . [the mortgagor] ownership of the vessel
passed to ... [the mortgagee] despite the fact that technical legal title
had not yet passed.30
The court then returned to the test established in Flink:
27. The Milwaukee, 48 F.2d 842 (E.D. Wis. 1931); The Columbia, 37 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.
1930); The Giles Loring, 48 Fed. 463 (D. Me. 1890).
28. An additional ground for allowing limitation was that there was the possibility of other
claims arising which would be clearly subject to limitation. 167 F. Supp. 576, 579 (N.D.
Cal. 1958).
29. 290 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1961).
30. Id. at 645-46.
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This [is] for the reason that his relationship to the vessel is such as
might reasonably afford grounds upon which a claim of liability for
damages might be asserted against him, a claim predicated on his status
as the person perhaps ultimately responsible for the vessel's maintenance
and operation and a claim which the Limitation Act is designed to fur-
nish protection.3'
As pointed out by Benedict,3 a mortgagee out of possession and not ex-
ercising authority is not entitled to limitation of liability for the reason
that, not being active in the operation of the vessel, he cannot be under
a liability for the acts of those who have possession and actually operate
her, beyond the value of the vessel in rem. Hence he merely does not
need the protection of the statute.
Thus it is seen that congressional concern for the exigencies of the
shipowner has been interpreted by the courts to include concern for those
"owners" who do not hold title,8 those who split the legal and equitable
title, 4 those who have divested themselves of title, 5 and those who will
obtain title in the future.3 6 The sole element common to these "owners"
is the possibility that they may be subjected to the liability which is ordi-
narily assertable against one having dominion over a ship. Apparently
the common meaning of "owner" to be "the person in whom is vested
the ownership, dominion, or title of property . . ."" is not controlling.
LIABILITY OF THE CO-OWNERS
There are several methods by which title to a ship is held that re-
ceive the benefit of the limitation act because full title, interest, or domin-
ion is not a requisite of ownership.38 The title held by a group of
individuals on shares 9 or by a partnership" is as much within the scope
of the act as that held by an individual.4' The corporation is probably
the most common type of owner of vessels;42 it is also entitled to the
benefit of limitation of liability.43  In most situations the party that is
the registered owner is entitled to petition for limitation of liabiliy.44
31. Ibid.
32. 3 BENEDICT, AMERICAN ADMIRALTY 415 (6th ed. 1940).
33. Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59 (1929).
34. Petition of Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73 (D. Conn. 1954).
35. In re The Trojan, 167 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
36. Admiral Towing Co. v. Woolen, 290 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1961).
37. BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY 1259 (4th ed. 1951).
38. The Milwaukee, 48 F.2d 842 (E.D. Wis. 1931).
39. Christopher v. Grueby, 40 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1930).
40. See Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 63 (1929).
41. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
42. 3 BENEDICT, AMERICAN ADMIRALTY 414-15 (6th ed. 1940).
43. Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Chesapeake Lighterage & Towing
Co., 16 F.2d 765, 766 (4th Cir. 1927); Pocomoke Guano Co. v. Eastern Transp. Co., 285
Fed. 7, 9 (4th Cit. 1922).
44. See In re Great Lakes Transit Corp., 81 F.2d 441 (6th Cit. 1936); Petition of Martin,
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Regardless of the form in which the ownership is cast and the num-
ber of persons within a given group, each person having a share of the
vessel is considered separately in ascertaining whether he is entitled to
limitation. In other words, some members of the group of owners may
be entitled to limitation while others may be denied that protection, de-
pending on whether the loss occurred with or without their privity or
knowledge. 5 The statute is intended to encourage investment in the
maritime industry, but not to protect those investors who are in privity
with the cause of the loss. For example, in Cusumano v. The Curlew46
it was held that a co-owner of a fishing vessel at fault in a collision, who
was below deck and who did not participate in the navigation, was en-
titled to limit his liability. However, his co-owner, who was the vessel's
captain and in charge of the navigation leading to the collision, could not
limit his liability." The distinction in the extent of the liability of the
co-owners lies in the difference in their roles at the time of the collision.
One was passive, in effect only an investor. The other was active, and
negligent, in the operation of the vessel. Similarly, in Successors De
Esmoris & Co. v. Whitney & Bodden Shipping Co.48 one corporate part-
owner of a vessel was entitled to limit its liability on a charter party that
the other part-owner had negotiated. The court stated:
[T]he joint owner should be no more liable where the contract is
signed by another joint owner than if it was signed by the master or some
other agent.
To construe it otherwise seems to me would be to emasculate the
statute, for its very purpose was to separate the liability of the various
joint owners one from the other.49
Moreover, if the part-owner is entitled to limitation, his liability is limited
to the proportion of any debts and liabilities that his individual share in
the vessel bears to the whole."  In Whitcomb v. Emerson51 it was held
that where repairs were ordered by a shipmaster, who was also one of
102 F. Supp. 43 (R.D. Pa. 1951). But see American Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 289
U.S. 261 (1933). The fact that the vessel is not registered does not prevent limitation of
liability. Wallace v. Providence & Stonington Steam-Ship Co., 14 Fed. 56 (C.C.D. Mass.
1882).
45. See Christopher v. Grueby, 40 F.2d 8, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1930). It is clear that the use
in §§ 183 and 185 of "owner" instead of the "owner or owners" of the earlier version does
not exclude a limitation of the liability of a part-owner. Thommasen v. Whitwill, 12 Fed.
891, 903 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1882), aff'd, 118 U.S. 520 (1886).
46. 105 F. Supp. 428 (D. Mass. 1952).
47. Id. at 433.
48. 39 F.2d 191 (S.D. Ala. 1930).
49. Id. at 192-93. See Keene v. The Whistler, 14 Fed. Gas. 208 (No. 7645) (D. Cal. 1873).
50. 23 Star. 57 (1884), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 189 (1958). Benner Line v. Pendleton,
210 Fed. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), rev'd on other grounds, 217 Fed. 497 (2d Cir. 1914),
a&f'd, 246 U.. 353 (1918).
51. 50 Fed. 128 (D. Mass. 1892).
19631
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
three equal part-owners of a vessel, without the privity or knowledge of
the other owners, he was primarily liable for the whole debt, and the
other two owners were each primarily liable for one-third of it.5" The
lack of privity of two of the co-owners limited their share in the liability
to the same share that they had in the vessel. However, the privity of the
shipmaster prevented limitation of his liability, and he was liable for the
entire debt, not merely one-third of it. Thus liability beyond the limita-
tion amount among those not entitled to limitation is not joint, but is
several.
Neither the form nor the composition of the ownership unit is im-
portant in determining limitation vel non. The federal government,58
a division thereof such as the Director General of Railroads 4 or the
United States Shipping Board,5" or a government-owned corporation such
as the Emergency Fleet Corporation " may be an owner within the mean-
ing of the act and therefore limit its liability." It seems dear that the
owner is entitled to limitation whether he is American or foreign."8
Although the act in its several sections speaks in general terms of
"the owner of the vessel" as being entitled to limitation, the act is
very specific in regard to the effect of the limitation provisions upon the
master and seamen. It is dear that merely because one of the owners
is also an officer or a crew member he is not denied the protection of
the act 9 However, it is more likely that such a part-owner is chargeable
with privity or knowledge of the unseaworthiness or negligence that
results in the liability arising, which would place him beyond the pro-
tection of the act. The statute recognizes this probability and provides
that nothing in the act be construed to affect the remedy to which any
party may be entitled against the master, officers, and seamen in those
capacities.
60
52. See also The Giles Loring, 48 Fed. 463 (D. Me. 1890).
53. Kutger v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 104, 106 (N.D. Fla. 1958).
54. See The Princess Anne, 5 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1925); Hines v. Butler, 278 Fed. 877 (4th
Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 659 (1922).
55. See The West Hartland, 295 Fed. 547 (W.D. Wash. 1923), af'd, 2 F.2d 834 (9th
Cir. 1924).
56. Ibid.
57. "The United States ... [or a corporation owned by it] shall be entitled to the benefits
of all exemptions and of all limitations of liability accorded by law to the owners, charterers,
operators, or agents of vessels." 41 Stat. 527 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 746 (1958); 43 Stat.
1113 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 789 (1958).
58. 9 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1958). See The Princess Sophia,
61 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 604 (1933). However, insofar as S
4 of the Death on the High Seas Act refers to foreign law, the present act is unavailable to
foreign shippers. The Vestris, 53 F.2d 847, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), af'd, 57 F.2d 176 (2d
Cir. 1932), limitation denied on-rehearing, 60 F.2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
59. See Cusumano v. The Curlew, 105 F. Supp. 428 (D. Mass. 1952).
60. 9 Star. 636 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 187 (1958). The section of the act limit-
ing liability for loss of valuable objects to their stated value is for the benefit of "the master
[VoL 14:2
Limitation of Liability Act
CONCLUSION
The extensive use of the corporation as a form of ownership of ships,
the prevalence of insurance, and the use of direct government subsidies
to the maritime industry have resulted in a situation that differs greatly
from that in which the concept of the limitation of liability developed."'
Because of this there is at least some reason to believe that the judicial
attitude in the second half of the twentieth century will be, on the whole,
hostile to the limitation idea, that the early cases will be whittled down
if they are not flatly overruled, and that the statute, even without further
limiting amendments, will be narrowly and not expansively construed. 2
Moreover, there is every indication to believe that there will be extensive
revision of the act in order to eliminate the ambiguities and to increase
the amount available to injured claimants."3
Despite this interest in restricting the limitation principle, it is sub-
mitted that the liberality of the courts in construing the word "owner"
will continue and will not be affected by any amendment to the act.
An equitable standard of "ownership" has been established, and as long
as there is provision- for limitation it is reasonable to assume that any
stricture upon the concept will occur in the extent of limitation rather
than in the extent of coverage. The general rule will remain that one
can limit his liability as an owner. if he is liable as an owner.
LEROY L. LAMBORN*
and owner of such vessel." 9 Star. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 5 181 (1958). The
reason for this sole inclusion of the master is not apparent.
61. See I EDELMAN, MARnTim INJuRY AND DEATH 582 n.32 (1960). See also Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 437 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
62. GiumoRE & BLACK, ADMRALTY 666:67 (1957).
63. See Senate Comm. on Commerce, Limiting the Liability of Shipowners, S. REP. No.
1602, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). This report recommends passage of Senate Bill 2314, as
amended. The bill would extend the privilege of limitation of liability to "... the charterer,
manager, and operator of the ship, and to the pilot, and to the master, members of the crew,
and other servants of the owner, charterer, manager, or operator acting in the course of their
employment, and to their respective insurers as well as to the insurers of the ship or of the
owner, in the same way as they apply to an owner himself...." S. 2314, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 8(b) (1962). See also H.R. 7912, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
0 Associate Editor, WE TERN RESERVE LAw REvIEw (1961-1962).
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